Download pdf of Husserl's Book Cartesian Meditations

March 08, 2008 - Facts, Ideas And Logic

Husserlreturns to Descartes in order to present his own transcendental Phenomenology. He explains this as the need to repeat Descartes' gesture of moving inwards in order to construct philosophy in a pure and systematc way, from nothing.

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1 . Descartes' Meditations as the prototype of philosophical
reflection 1
2. The necessity of a radical new beginning of philosophy 4
FIRST MEDITATION. THE WAY TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO
3. The Cartesian overthrow and the guiding final idea
of an absolute grounding of science 7
4. Uncovering the final sense of science by becoming
immersed in science qua noematic phenomenon ... 9
5. Evidence and the idea of genuine science 11
6. Differentiations of evidence. The philosophical demand
for an evidence that is apodictic and first in
itself 14
7. The evidence for the factual existence of the world
not apodictic ; its inclusion in the Cartesian overthrow 17
8. The ego~cogito as transcendental subjectivity . ... 18
9. The range covered by apodictic evidence of the"lam" 22
10. Digression: Descartes' failure to make the transcendental
turn 23
11. The psychological and the transcendental Ego. The
transcendency of the world 25
SECOND MEDITATION. THE FIELD OF TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE
LAID OPEN IN RESPECT OF ITS UNIVERSAL
STRUCTURES
12. The idea of a transcendental grounding of knowledge 27
13. Necessity of at first excluding problems relating to
the range covered by transcendental knowledge ... 29
14. The stream ofcogitationes. Cogito and cogitatum ... 31
15. Natural and transcendental reflection 33
16. Digression: Necessary beginning of both transcendental
"purely psychological" reflection with the
ego cogito 37
CONTENTS
17. The two-sidedness of inquiry into consciousness as
an investigation of correlatives. Lines of description.
Synthesis as the primal form belonging to consciousness
39
18. Identification as the fundamental form of synthesis.
The all-embracing synthesis of transcendental time 41
19. Actuality and potentiality of intentional life . ... 44
20. The peculiar nature of intentional analysis 46
21. The intentional object as
"
transcendental clue" ... 50
22. The idea of the universal unity comprising all
objects, and the task of clarifying it constitutionally 53
THIRD MEDITATION. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. TRUTH
AND ACTUALITY
23. A more pregnant concept of constitution, under the
titles "reason" and '"unreason" 56
24. Evidence as itself-givenness and the modifications of
evidence 57
25. Actuality and quasi-actuality 58
26. Actuality as the correlate of evident varification . . 59
27. Habitual and potential evidence as functioning constitutively
for the sense "existing object" 60
28. Presumptive evidence of world-experience. World
as an idea correlative to a perfect experiential evidence
61
29. Material and formal ontological regions as indexes
pointing to transcendental systems of evidence ... 62
FOURTH MEDITATION. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO
HIMSELF
30. The transcendental ego inseparable from the processes
making up his life 65
31. The Ego as identical pole of the subjective processes 66
32. The Ego as substrate of habitualities 66
33. The full concretion of the Ego as monad and the
problem of his self-constitution 67
34. A fundamental development of phenomenological
method. Transcendental analysis as eidetic 69
CONTENTS IX
35. Excursus into eidetic internal psychology ..... 72
36. The transcendental ego as the universe of possible
forms of subjective process. The compossibility of
subjective processes in coexistence or succession as
subject to eidetic laws 73
37. lime as the universal form of all egological genesis 75
38. Active and passive genesis 77
39. Association as a principle of passive genesis .... 80
40. Transition to the question of transcendental idealism 81
41. Genuine phenomenological explication of one's own
"ego cogito" as transcendantal idealism 83
FIFTH MEDITATION. UNCOVERING OF THE SPHERE OF
TRANSCENDENTAL BEING AS MONADOLOGICAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY
42. Exposition of the problem of experiencing someone
else, in rejoinder to the objection that phenomenology
entails solipsism 89
43. The noematic-ontic mode of givenness of the Other,
as transcendental clue for the constitutional theory
of the experience of someone else 90
44. Reduction of transcendental experience to the sphere
of ownness 92
45. The transcendental ego, and self-apperception as a
psychophysical man reduced to what is included in
my ownness 99
46. Ownness as the sphere of the actualities and potentialities
of the stream of subjective processes 100
47. The intentional object also belongs to the full
monadic concretion of ownness. Immanent transcendence
and primordial world 103
48. The transcendency of the Objective world as belonging
to a level higher than that of primordial
transcendency 105
49. Predelineation of the course to be followed by intentional
explication of experiencing what is other 106
50. The mediate intentionality of experiencing someone
else, as "appresentation" (analogical apperception) . 108
of the experience of someone else 90
CONTENTS
51 . "Pairing" as an associatively constitutive component
of my experience of someone else 112
52. Appresentation as a kind of experience with its own
style of verification 113
53. Potentialities of the primordial sphere and their
constitutive function in the apperception of the
Other 116
54. Explicating the sense of the appresentation wherein
I experience someone else 117
55. Establishment of the community of monads. The
first form of Objectivity: intersubjective Nature . . 120
56. Constitution of higher levels of intermonadic community
128
57. Clarification of the parallel between explication of
what is internal to the psyche and egological transcendental
explication 131
58. Differentiation of problems in the intentional analysis
of higher intersubjective communities. I and my surrounding
world 131
59. Ontological explication and its place within constitutional
transcendental phenomenology as a whole . 136
60. Metaphysical results of our explication of experiencing
someone else 139
61. The traditional problems of "psychological origins"
and their phenomenological clarification 141
62. Survey of our intentional explication of experiencing
someone else 148
CONCLUSION
63. The task of criticizing transcendental experience and
knowledge , 151
64. Concluding word 152

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